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Confidence and Construal Framing: When
Confidence Increases versus Decreases
Information Processing
ECHO WEN WAN
DEREK D. RUCKER
A large literature demonstrates that people process information more carefully in
states of low compared to high confidence. This article presents an alternative
hypothesis that either high or low confidence can increase or decrease information
processing on the basis of how information is construed. Five experiments dem-
onstrate two sets of findings supporting this alternative formulation. First, low con-
fidence leads people to focus on concrete construals, whereas high confidence
leads people to focus on abstract construals. Second, people in a state of low
confidence view messages framed in a concrete manner as more relevant and
thus engage in greater processing of messages framed concretely; in contrast,
people in a state of high confidence view messages framed in an abstract manner
as more relevant and thus engage in greater processing of messages framed
abstractly. These results enrich the literature by providing a fundamental shift in
understanding how psychological confidence influences information processing.
Garnering consumers’ attention to information is oftena key goal of advertising and marketing efforts (Pieters
and Wedel 2004; Rucker and Petty 2006). Indeed, a large
literature testifies to the fact that increased attention to com-
munications with compelling arguments enhances persua-
sion (e.g., Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Petty and Wegener
1998; Rucker, Petty, and Priester 2007). As such, an im-
portant goal of past research has been to understand vari-
ables that increase or decrease information processing. For
example, consumers attend more to information when the
information is personally relevant, when there are incentives
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to do so, or when they naturally enjoy thinking (for a review,
see Petty and Wegener 1998).
The general degree of confidence that people experience
on the basis of either chronic or situational factors is known
to govern consumers’ information processing (Kruglanski
1989; Petty et al. 2007). High confidence is a state of feeling
sure and certain about one’s environment, actions, and ideas,
whereas low confidence, or doubt, is a state of feeling unsure
and uncertain about one’s environment, actions, and ideas
(Kruglanski 1989; Tormala, Rucker, and Seger 2008). A
number of papers find that chronic or situationally induced
states of low confidence lead to more information processing
than do states of high confidence. For example, Weary and
Jacobson (1997) found that people chronically uncertain of
the causes of outcomes in their environment engaged in
greater information processing than those chronically con-
fident of causes of outcomes. Similarly, Brin˜ol et al. (2007)
found that relative to individuals in a state of high power,
which was associated with high confidence, individuals in
a state of low power, which was associated with low con-
fidence, were more influenced by whether the merits of an
argument were strong (i.e., compelling) or weak (i.e., spe-
cious), a classic measure of processing (see Petty and Ca-
cioppo 1986; Petty and Wegener 1998; Rucker et al. 2007).
Tiedens and Linton (2001) also found that people engaged
in greater processing when induced with emotions associ-
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ated with low confidence (e.g., worry) than when induced
with emotions associated with high confidence (e.g., anger).
The main explanation for these past findings is that even
incidental states of low confidence prompt individuals to
infer that they have insufficient knowledge in a given sit-
uation, which motivates them to compensate by systemat-
ically seeking out and processing information (Chaiken, Lib-
erman, and Eagly 1989; Maheswaran and Chaiken 1991;
Wood and Lynch 2002). In contrast, high confidence leads
people to infer that their knowledge is sufficient and there
is no need to carefully process additional information, which
prompts heuristic processing (Maheswaran and Chaiken
1991). In the current research, we question how pervasive
and unwavering the association between low confidence
(high confidence) and increased (decreased) information
processing is. We propose that a crucial moderator between
consumers’ level of confidence and information processing
is the level of abstraction at which a message is framed.
REVERSING THE INFLUENCE OF
CONFIDENCE ON INFORMATION
PROCESSING
Although the majority of past research is consistent with
the proposition that states of high confidence decrease in-
formation processing, there is a minority report suggesting
that this association is not set in stone. For example, Correll,
Spencer, and Zanna (2004) showed that self-affirmation en-
hanced confidence and led to a greater sensitivity to weak
versus strong arguments, presumably because self-affirma-
tion enhances one’s objectivity. Albarracı´n and Mitchell
(2004) found that people highly confident in their ability to
defend their attitudes processed counterattitudinal infor-
mation more carefully than those with low defensive con-
fidence because high defensive confidence led people to
believe they could defend their attitudes against counter-
arguments successfully. These findings form an initial crack
in the long-established foundation between confidence and
information processing (see also Tormala et al. 2008).
In the current work, we propose that the psychological
states of high and low confidence might evoke qualitatively
different types of thinking with respect to their level of
construal (Trope and Liberman 2003). In particular, we put
forth three specific hypotheses. First, states of high confi-
dence tend to lead consumers to think at a more abstract
level of construal, whereas states of low confidence tend to
lead consumers to think at a more concrete level of construal
(Trope and Liberman 2003). Second, differences in construal
naturally orient people to focus on, and view as relevant,
different types of information. Low confidence will lead
people to view a message framed in a concrete manner as
more relevant, whereas high confidence will lead people to
view a message framed in an abstract manner as more rel-
evant. Third, as a result of this difference in relevance, mes-
sage processing will be affected by the relation between
consumers’ confidence level and the message frame. When
a message is framed in a concrete manner, the “classic”
effect of confidence will emerge (i.e., more processing under
low confidence than high confidence). In contrast, when a
message is framed in an abstract manner, the effects of con-
fidence will reverse (i.e., more processing under high con-
fidence than low confidence).
In testing these hypotheses, the current article makes two
broad contributions to the literature. First, a novel relation-
ship between psychological confidence and construal level
is documented. Second, confidence is shown to produce both
less and more information processing, depending on whether
information is framed in a concrete or abstract fashion.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Psychological Confidence and Construal Level
According to research on psychological confidence (Chai-
ken et al. 1989; Wood and Lynch 2002), being confident
means consumers feel that they have the necessary knowl-
edge and skills for handling an issue, or they know that a
course of action is correct, and outcomes can be accurately
predicted. This feeling of certainty signals a benign situation
in which people have a low need to engage in piecemeal
understanding of information. Consistent with this notion,
past research on information processing has suggested that
perceiving a situation as benign often triggers top-down
processing (Schwarz 2002, 2004; Sujan 1985), and top-
down processing, in turn, has been suggested to be guided
by high-level, abstract concepts and schematic information
(Johnson 1984; Park and Smith 1989). Because thinking
about high-level and goal-related information is character-
istic of abstract construals (Liberman and Trope 1998;
Trope, Liberman, and Wakslak 2007), we predict that states
of confidence naturally orient consumers to construe infor-
mation at an abstract level. As a consequence, confidence
should lead to the construction of schematic, decontextual-
ized representations of objects and describing events in
terms of the superordinate, essential, and goal-related fea-
tures.
In contrast, when feeling low in confidence, people are
uncertain about whether they have enough knowledge to
handle the issue or whether the course of action is correct.
In such a situation, people tend to focus on the “data” at
hand and place their thinking toward low-level details and
contextualized information (Chaiken et al. 1989; Mahes-
waran and Chaiken 1991; Weary and Jacobson 1997; Wood
and Lynch 2002). Focusing on low-level details and inci-
dental information in the context, as done by people with
low confidence, is the characteristic of low-level and con-
crete construals (Liberman and Trope 1998; Trope and Lib-
erman 2003; Trope et al. 2007). We thus predict that low
confidence orients an individual to construe information at
a concrete level. As a consequence, low confidence should
lead to contextualized representations of objects and include
subordinate, incidental, and means-related features of events
(Liberman and Trope 1998; Trope and Liberman 2003;
Trope et al. 2007).
Although not tested explicitly, our proposition is consis-
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tent with several findings in the literature. Research on action
identification theory (Vallacher and Wegner 1987) finds that
the level of confidence influences the way people identify
objects. When an activity is hard to handle, due to task
difficulty or lack of experience, which might be associated
with low confidence, people are more likely to focus on the
low-level details of objects (Vallacher and Wegner 1987;
Vallacher, Wegner, and Somoza 1989). Conversely, situa-
tions that could be linked to high confidence appear to lead
individuals to think more about the high-level identity of
objects that signifies why the action is performed (e.g., the
goal and meaning of the action). For example, Vallacher et
al. (1989) found that when making a speech to audiences
perceived to be relatively easy to persuade (i.e., participants
could be confident), individuals focused on the high-level
identity of this action, such as the significance and the goal
of the speech.
Findings from the literature on positive affect are also
consistent with the proposition that states of high or low
confidence can produce different construals. High confi-
dence is a characteristic often related to positive affect (Lyu-
bomirsky, King, and Diener 2005), and positive affect has
been found to increase abstract construals (Labroo and Pat-
rick 2009). Although not tested empirically, it is possible
that the confidence accompanying positive affect is involved
in generating thoughts and construals at the abstract level.
Finally, prior research on power further supports the idea
that high confidence might lead to abstract construals. States
of high power are found to increase individuals’ general
sense of confidence (Brin˜ol et al. 2007; Rucker and Galinsky
2008). Furthermore, independent research has linked a state
of high power to abstract thinking. Smith and Trope (2006)
found that individuals primed with high power tended to
categorize stimuli at a high level of identity. The association
between confidence and power and the finding that power
induces abstract thinking again alludes to the possibility that
high confidence might be linked with abstract construals.
These findings from distinct domains, although bearing
no direct tests on the relationship between confidence and
the level of construal, provide anecdotal evidence consistent
with our proposed relationship. Formally, we put forth the
following hypothesis.
H1: High confidence will lead consumers to construe
information at an abstract level, whereas low con-
fidence will lead consumers to construe infor-
mation at a concrete level.
Confidence and Information Processing: The
Relevance of Messages Framed with Abstract
versus Concrete Construals
A shared finding across psychology and marketing is that
consumers’ depth of information processing (e.g., discrim-
ination between weak and strong arguments) is increased
when the target message is viewed as highly relevant to
consumers’ personal well-being, personality characteristics,
or even psychological states (Aaker and Lee 2001; DeBono
and Packer 1991; Tormala et al. 2008). For example, Aaker
and Lee (2001) showed that participants with a dominant
independent self-view (interdependent self-view) regarded
a message as more relevant to them when the message im-
plied a promotion goal (prevention goal) and that this led
to a better discrimination between strong and weak argu-
ments.
In the current work, we suggest that the relation between
confidence and construal level informs what type of infor-
mation is relevant to people on the basis of their state of
confidence. Because people in a psychological state of low
confidence orientate their thinking toward low-level details
and contextualized information, we suggest that they are
naturally sensitive to and focused on more concrete infor-
mation. Because of this focus, when people in a state of
low confidence encounter concrete information, it feels like
the type of information they should attend to, and therefore
it is viewed as relevant, which evokes greater attention and
greater information processing. In contrast, because people
in a state of high confidence construct information from a
top-down angle and activate a high-level and global per-
spective, we suggest that they are naturally sensitive to and
focused on more abstract information. Because of this al-
ternate focus, when people in a state of high confidence
encounter abstract information, it feels like the type of in-
formation they should attend to, and therefore it is viewed
as relevant, which evokes greater attention and greater in-
formation processing.
In the current work, we test the relationship among con-
fidence, construal level, and information processing by sys-
tematically varying whether the same message content is
presented at a low or a high level of construal. Specifically,
on the basis of the notion that information can be represented
at different levels of construal (Liberman and Trope 1998;
Trope and Liberman 2003), it is possible to frame a message
containing the same content in either an abstract or a con-
crete level of construal. For example, a fitness club could
be framed at a concrete level of construal by highlighting
its subordinate and incidental feature of practicing daily
health activities or framed at an abstract level of construal
by highlighting its superordinate and essential feature of
building lifelong health. On the basis of our previous dis-
cussion, a message framed at a concrete level of construal
should fit with the natural orientation of those in a state of
low confidence and therefore be viewed as more relevant.
In contrast, a message framed at an abstract level of construal
should fit with the natural orientation of those in a state of
high confidence and therefore be viewed as more relevant.
On the basis of past findings that information will be
processed more carefully when the target message is re-
garded as more relevant (DeBono and Packer 1991; Tormala
et al. 2008), we propose a new type of matching wherein
people in a state of low confidence will engage in greater
processing of messages framed using concrete construals,
whereas people in a state of high confidence will engage in
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greater processing of messages framed using abstract con-
struals.
H2: When in a state of high confidence, consumers
will view messages framed at an abstract level of
construal as more relevant. In contrast, when in a
state of low confidence, consumers will view mes-
sages framed at a concrete level of construal as
more relevant.
H3: Because of differences in relevance, consumers in
a state of high confidence will engage in greater
information processing (i.e., a greater differenti-
ation between strong and weak arguments) when
a message is framed at an abstract level of con-
strual. However, consumers in a state of low con-
fidence will engage in greater information pro-
cessing when a message is framed at a concrete
level of construal.
Although our hypotheses have not received a direct test,
prior research that documented a decrease in information
processing for high confidence (vs. low confidence) appears
to have described such messages using concrete construals.
For example, Edwards (2003) instructed participants to eval-
uate a comprehensive exam described as enabling them to
enhance grades. Describing the benefit of the exam in terms
of grade improvement is a more concrete construal, whereas
a more abstract construal would be to present the exam as
benefiting one’s intellectual or career development in the
long run. As another example, Tiedens and Linton (2001)
exposed participants to a message that described the attri-
butes of a camcorder in terms of the detailed specifications,
which again seems to be at the concrete construal. Of course,
a limitation of past work with respect to our current hy-
potheses is that previous work did not systematically vary
construal levels. It is therefore unclear whether the con-
creteness versus abstraction played a role in these studies.
Thus, the link between construal frame of messages and
information processing remains to be examined.
We tested our hypotheses across five experiments. Ex-
periments 1–3 tested whether high confidence and low con-
fidence lead to qualitatively different thinking associated
with abstract and concrete construals (hypothesis 1), re-
spectively. Experiments 4 and 5 examined how states of low
versus high confidence interact with the construal frame of
the message to affect perceived relevance (hypothesis 2) and
information processing (hypothesis 3).
EXPERIMENT 1: RELATING
CONFIDENCE TO CONSTRUAL LEVEL
In experiment 1 we tested our proposition that high con-
fidence leads to an abstract construal and low confidence
leads to a concrete construal. Specifically, we manipulated
participants’ state of confidence (low vs. high) and then
measured their construal level using the Behavioral Iden-
tification Form (BIF; Vallacher and Wegner 1989), an es-
tablished measure of construal level (Agrawal and Wan
2009; Fujita et al. 2006).
Method
Ninety-seven undergraduate students in Hong Kong par-
ticipated in this study in exchange for HK$60. Participants
were randomly assigned to high-confidence, low-confi-
dence, or baseline conditions. They first completed a four-
question quiz about fitness knowledge. These questions were
moderately difficult, so that participants would be able to
respond but were not likely to be very confident about the
accuracy of their answers. Next, we gave participants in the
high- and the low-confidence conditions false feedback
about their knowledge level. Participants in the high-con-
fidence condition received feedback that they had adequate
knowledge about fitness and that they could benefit by using
such knowledge. In contrast, those in the low-confidence
condition received feedback that their knowledge about fit-
ness was inadequate and problematic and that they should
be careful in using such knowledge. After reviewing the
feedback, participants rated their confidence in fitness
knowledge on a 9-point scale (1 p not confident at all; 9
p very confident). Participants in the baseline condition did
not perform the quiz task and instead wrote a short essay
about their last grocery-shopping experience (Rucker and
Galinsky 2008).
Next, participants were asked to complete the BIF (Val-
lacher and Wegner 1989). The BIF consisted of 25 questions
that ask participants to read a statement of an action (e.g.,
making a list) and two descriptions of this action. One de-
scription defined the action in terms of how it was performed
(e.g., writing something down), consistent with a concrete
construal. The other description defined the action in terms
of why it was performed (e.g., getting things organized),
consistent with an abstract construal. For each question,
participants chose the description they found to better cap-
ture the activity. In addition, participants reported their
mood on five 9-point semantic differentials (sad–happy,
feeling bad–feeling good, irritable–pleased, depressed–
cheerful, upset–joyful). Finally, participants were debriefed,
paid, and thanked.
Results
Confidence Manipulation Check. A one-way ANOVA
between the low- and the high-confidence conditions dem-
onstrated that participants who received feedback that they
had adequate knowledge reported feeling more confident
( , ) than participants who received theM p 6.26 SD p 1.54
feedback that their knowledge was inadequate ( ,M p 4.15
; , ).SD p 1.56 F(1, 65) p 30.98 p ! .001
Construal Level. Following Vallacher and Wegner (1989),
we obtained a construal level score for each participant by
assigning 0 for choosing the concrete construal option and
1 for choosing the abstract construal option for each of the
25 actions in the BIF questionnaire. The scores were
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summed such that a higher score indicates a higher construal
level. A one-way ANOVA indicated a significant effect of
the confidence manipulation ( , ).F(1, 94) p 9.56 p ! .001
Those in the low- ( , ) and the high-M p 15.09 SD p 3.91
confidence ( , ) conditions differedM p 19.12 SD p 3.42
significantly ( , ). In addition, par-F(1, 94) p 19.12 p ! .001
ticipants in the baseline condition ( ,M p 17.10 SD p
) scored lower on the BIF than participants in the high-3.97
confidence condition ( , ) but higherF(1, 94) p 4.57 p ! .04
than those in the low-confidence condition (F(1, 94) p
, ). These results support hypothesis 1 that high4.47 p ! .04
confidence (low confidence) is associated with more (less)
abstract construals.
Mood. A one-way ANOVA on a composite of the five
general mood questions ( ) indicated no differencesa p .93
in participants’ mood as a function of whether participants
were primed to feel high ( , ) or lowM p 5.89 SD p 1.12
confidence ( , ) or were in the baselineM p 6.00 SD p 1.04
condition ( , ; ). We measuredM p 5.68 SD p 1.08 F ! 1
participants’ mood in all experiments and found that it does
not explain our results. We therefore do not discuss mood
measures further.
In addition to this experiment, we replicated the results
in a population of American participants. Details of this
additional experiment are available from the authors.
EXPERIMENT 2: THE
CATEGORIZATION TASK
Experiment 2 tested the link between confidence and con-
struals by using a different manipulation of confidence and
assessed how confidence affected the breadth of categories
used in a categorization task. According to research on con-
strual level (Liberman, Sagristano, and Trope 2002; Trope
and Liberman 2003), abstract categories are more inclusive
than concrete categories (e.g., the abstract category of food
is more inclusive than the concrete category of dessert). If
high confidence leads to an abstract construal but low con-
fidence leads to a concrete construal, participants should
generate fewer categories to classify objects when they are
in a state of high versus low confidence.
Method
Fifty-one undergraduate students in Hong Kong partici-
pated in this study, and each received HK$60. Participants
were randomly assigned to a low-confidence, a high-con-
fidence, or a baseline condition. They first performed an
advertising evaluation study that was used to place partic-
ipants in a relative state of high or low confidence. The
cover story of this task informed participants that they would
carefully review and answer questions about three adver-
tisements for a wealth management service. High versus
low confidence was manipulated by using two different sets
of advertising slogans. One set of slogans highlighted the
implications of being highly confident and certain, with ad-
vertising copy such as “With confidence, you can reach truly
amazing heights.” The other set of slogans emphasized the
implications of being low in confidence, doubtful, and un-
certain, with copy such as “Doubt is the beginning, not the
end, of wisdom.” Presenting three ads in each condition was
used to prime high or low confidence among participants
(for a conceptually similar idea, see Collins and Loftus 1975;
Hamann 1990).
After reading the ads, participants rated how confident
they felt on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all con-
fident) to 9 (very confident). Participants then indicated their
attitudes toward the ads on three 9-point semantic differ-
entials (bad–good, negative–positive, dislike–like), with
higher numbers indicating more favorable attitudes. Partic-
ipants in the baseline condition did not receive the adver-
tising study but, as in experiment 1, were instead asked to
write a short essay about a previous grocery-shopping ex-
perience.
Next, participants were asked to classify 44 objects related
to camping (e.g., brush, tent, camera) into groups. They were
instructed that every item should be included and there
should be no overlaps between groups. Following past re-
search (Liberman et al. 2000), we used the number of groups
that participants classified as a measure of construal level
(Liberman et al. 2002). Finally, participants were debriefed,
paid, and thanked.
Results
Confidence Manipulation Check. A one-way ANOVA
revealed a significant effect of the confidence manipulation
( , ). Participants in the high-confi-F(1, 49) p 9.05 p ! .01
dence condition ( , ) were more con-M p 5.94 SD p 1.08
fident than those in the low-confidence condition (M p
, ; , ). In addition,4.00 SD p 1.46 F(1, 49) p 18.09 p ! .001
participants in the baseline condition felt less confident
( , ) than those in the high-confidenceM p 5.00 SD p 1.41
condition ( , ) but more confidentF(1, 49) p 4.25 p ! .05
than those in the low-confidence condition (F(1, 49) p
, ). A one-way ANOVA on a composite of the4.80 p ! .04
three attitude items ( ) showed that the ads used toa p .89
elicit high ( , ) or low confidenceM p 5.54 SD p 1.98
( , ) did not foster differences in atti-M p 5.33 SD p 1.30
tudes ( ). Similar null effects on attitudes were foundF ! 1
in the other studies using the advertising task to manipulate
confidence, and we will not discuss this measure further.
Number of Groups Categorized. A one-way ANOVA on
the number of groups classified by participants indicated a
significant effect ( , ). ParticipantsF(1, 49) p 8.88 p p .001
in the baseline condition classified the items for camping
into more groups ( , ) than those in theM p 5.35 SD p 1.83
high-confidence condition ( , ; F(1, 49) pM p 4.17 SD p 1.33
4.03, ) but into fewer groups than those in the low-p p .05
confidence condition ( , ;M p 6.65 SD p 1.90 F(1, 49) p
, ). In addition, the difference between the low-4.87 p ! .04
and the high-confidence conditions was significant (F(1, 49)
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p 17.75, ). These results further support hypothesisp ! .001
1 that states of high confidence trigger a focus on abstract
construals, whereas states of low confidence trigger a focus
on concrete construals.
EXPERIMENT 3: THE TRADE-OFF
BETWEEN FEASIBILITY AND
DESIRABILITY
Experiment 3 used a third approach to examine the link
between states of high versus low confidence and construal
level in a consumer decision context. We manipulated states
of high versus low confidence and observed participants’
preference for choice options involving the trade-off be-
tween the desirability and feasibility. Desirability is asso-
ciated with more abstract construals, and feasibility, with
more concrete construals (Liberman and Trope 1998; Trope
and Liberman 2003). If high confidence leads to an abstract
level of construal, high-confidence participants should ex-
hibit a greater preference for desirability than do low-con-
fidence participants.
Method
Sixty-one undergraduate students in Hong Kong partic-
ipated in this study in exchange for HK$60. Participants first
completed the advertising study to manipulate high versus
low confidence and then rated their confidence as in exper-
iment 2. Next, participants completed a choice task adapted
from Liberman and Trope (1998, experiment 2). The cover
story had participants imagine they were required to attend
a guest lecture at their university. Participants were told they
had to attend one of two lectures that varied with respect
to whether the lecture topic was interesting and relevant
(i.e., desirability—the aspect associated with an abstract
construal) or whether the lecture schedule was convenient
(i.e., feasibility—the aspect associated with a concrete con-
strual). The lecture with high desirability and low feasibility
was described as more interesting but took place early in
the morning on a day when students did not have to go to
school. The lecture with low desirability and high feasibility
was described as less interesting but occurred at a time when
the students were already at school. After reading the de-
scriptions, participants indicated their choice. Finally, par-
ticipants were debriefed, paid, and thanked.
Results and Discussion
Confidence Manipulation Check. A one-way ANOVA
confirmed that participants in the high-confidence condition
reported feeling more confident ( , )M p 6.39 SD p 1.32
than participants in the low-confidence condition (M p
, ; , ).5.16 SD p 1.50 F(1, 60) p 11.63 p p .001
Choice of Guest Lecture. We first performed a binary
logistic regression using the confidence states as the inde-
pendent variable (1 p high confidence; 0 p low confidence)
and choice as the dependent variable (1 p chose the high-
desirability option; 0 p chose the high-feasibility option).
The results indicated that being more confident led partic-
ipants to be more likely to choose the high-desirability op-
tion ( , Wald test p 3.98, ). We then com-b p 1.47 p ! .05
pared the choice share of the lectures across conditions. For
participants in the high-confident condition ( ), an p 33
larger proportion of them (91.9%) chose to sign up for the
lecture with high desirability over the lecture with high fea-
sibility (9.1%; , ). The reverse was foundz p 6.40 p ! .001
for less confident participants ( ), with a larger pro-n p 28
portion of them choosing to sign up for the lecture with
high feasibility (71.4%) compared to the one with high de-
sirability (28.6%; , ).z p 2.94 p ! .05
From another perspective, a larger proportion of partic-
ipants in the high-confident condition, compared to the low-
confident condition, chose the lecture with high desirability
( , ), whereas a larger proportion of partic-z p 4.87 p ! .001
ipants in the low-confident condition, compared to the high-
confident condition, chose the lecture with high feasibility
( , ). These results further support that highz p 4.79 p ! .001
confidence (vs. low confidence) led participants to construe
at the abstract level (hypothesis 1) and consequently in-
creased the preferences for the choice option with high de-
sirability compared to the choice option with high feasibility.
Using three distinct approaches in experiments 1–3, with
independently recognized measures from the construal lit-
erature and different manipulations of high versus low con-
fidence, we found converging support for our first hypothesis
that high confidence leads people to focus on more abstract
construals, whereas low confidence leads people to focus
on more concrete construals. In the next set of experiments,
we examined how confidence influences participants’ in-
formation processing in a product evaluation context in re-
lation to messages framed in an abstract versus concrete
fashion.
EXPERIMENT 4: ALIGNING CONFIDENCE
WITH CONSTRUAL FRAME
Given that experiments 1–3 demonstrated that a state of
low versus high confidence appears to naturally orient peo-
ple toward a low versus high level of construal, we predicted
that this would have implications for what type of infor-
mation naturally fits with their state. In accordance with our
second hypothesis, we predicted that a message framed in
an abstract fashion (e.g., the message is presented as high-
lighting essential and goal-related features of an issue or
object) would naturally fit with the orientation of a state of
high confidence, leading such messages to be viewed as
more relevant. Conversely, messages framed in a concrete
fashion (e.g., the message is presented as highlighting in-
cidental and means-related features of an issue or object)
would naturally fit with the orientation of a state of low
confidence, leading such messages to be viewed as more
relevant. As a consequence of differences in perceived rel-
evance, individuals in a state of low confidence should pro-
cess a message framed at a concrete level of construal more
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deeply, whereas individuals in a state of high confidence
should process a message framed at an abstract level of
construal more deeply.
To test our predictions, we manipulated participants’ con-
fidence, exposed them to product messages framed using
either abstract or concrete construals, manipulated the mes-
sage arguments to be either strong or weak, and assessed
the perceived relevance of the message. The inclusion of an
argument quality manipulation, strong versus weak, is an
established measure of depth of information processing
(Aaker and Lee 2001; Petty and Wegener 1998; Wan et al.
2010). Attitudinal differences between strong- and weak-
argument conditions are known to be larger when individ-
uals process information carefully. Therefore, according to
our perspective, attitudinal differences between strong and
weak arguments should be greater for participants in a state
of high confidence (low confidence) when the message is
framed in an abstract construal (a concrete construal).
The argument quality manipulation also allows us to ad-
dress an alternative explanation for the proposed effect. One
could argue that the matching between one’s state of con-
fidence and the message frame in an abstract construal (a
concrete construal) might induce a positive experience due
to processing ease (Wa¨nke, Bless, and Biller 1996), and this
positive experience might be used as a simple cue to enhance
individuals’ attitudes toward the described object, regardless
of the quality of the message. Unlike an information-pro-
cessing perspective, a simple cue explanation predicts a main
effect of matching on attitudes rather than an interaction
involving greater discrimination of argument quality.
Of course, it is also possible that differences in ease could
explain our results to the extent that a match between a state
of high (low) confidence and an abstract (concrete) message
frame makes it easier for individuals to process the message
and thus orients them to process it more. That is, a difference
in depth of information processing might not be driven by
information being viewed as more relevant but by infor-
mation being easier to process. To address this possibility,
we measured processing ease in the current experiment.
Experiment 4 manipulated the abstract versus concrete
construals activated in the message frame by describing the
benefit of the target object in a goal-related frame or a
means-related frame (Liberman and Trope 1998; Trope and
Liberman 2003). For example, for the event of moving to
a new apartment, thinking about the goal and why to move
(e.g., to start a new life) is consistent with an abstract con-
strual. In contrast, thinking about the means of moving and
how to carry out the move (e.g., packing and carrying boxes)
is consistent with a concrete construal (Liberman and Trope
1998). Importantly, we introduced the abstract versus con-
crete frames at the outset of the processing task and kept
the entire body of the message identical across construal
conditions. This approach allowed us to ensure that if we
observed differences in processing depth and attitudes, we
could attribute these differences solely to participants’ state
of confidence and the construal framing of the message as
opposed to any differences or weighting of the type of ar-
guments within the message content itself.
Method
One hundred and sixty-one undergraduate students in
Hong Kong participated in this study. Each of them received
HK$60. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 12
conditions in a 3 (confidence state: high vs. low vs. baseline)
# 2 (message frame: abstract construal vs. concrete con-
strual) # 2 (argument quality: strong vs. weak) between-
subjects design. First, participants completed the advertising
study that primed high versus low confidence and the same
manipulation check questions as used in experiments 2 and
3. Participants in the baseline condition did not receive this
manipulation.
Next, participants were asked to evaluate a fitness club.
They were first presented with a slogan for promoting this
fitness club, which actually manipulated the message frame
to be abstract or concrete. In both the abstract frame and
the concrete frame conditions, the slogan highlighted the
benefit of joining this fitness club to health. Adopting the
method used in Labroo and Patrick (2009, experiment 2b),
we described the benefit to health in either an abstract and
future-oriented manner (i.e., “enjoy lifelong health”) or a
concrete and present-oriented manner (i.e., “enjoy day-to-
day health activities”). A pretest with participants from the
same participant pool established the effectiveness of this
manipulation.
After reading the slogan, participants moved to another
page to read about the major facilities available in the target
fitness club. In the strong-arguments condition, participants
read that the fitness club offered a full range of exercise
facilities, individualized exercise classes on a regular basis,
and a personal trainer service on a daily basis. In the weak-
arguments condition, participants read that this fitness club
offered a limited range of exercise facilities, individualized
exercise classes on special request, and a personal trainer
service on the weekend. We pretested the strong and the
weak arguments using a separate sample of 40 participants
from the same participant pool, which established that, al-
though the messages for the fitness club described favorable
features in general, they differed in persuasiveness.
After reading the message, participants reported their at-
titudes on four 9-point semantic differentials (bad–good,
negative–positive, unfavorable–favorable, dislike–like), with
higher numbers indicating more favorable attitudes. In ad-
dition, participants responded to three questions that mea-
sured their perceived relevance of the message: How rele-
vant was the message about the fitness club to you/to your
values/to your interest? Participants also answered two ques-
tions about the ease of processing: How difficult (reverse
coded)/smooth was it to process the message? Responses to
these questions were all anchored on scales of 1 (not at all)
to 9 (very much). Finally, participants were debriefed, paid,
and thanked.
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FIGURE 1
RESULTS FOR FITNESS CLUB ATTITUDES (EXPERIMENT 4)
Results and Discussion
Confidence Manipulation Check. A 2 # 2 # 2 ANOVA
(without the baseline conditions) on participants’ confidence
indicated only a significant main effect of the confidence
manipulation: participants in the high-confidence condition
reported greater confidence ( , ) thanM p 5.52 SD p 1.50
participants in the low-confidence condition ( ,M p 4.31
, , ). No other effectsSD p 1.44 F(1, 114) p 19.89 p ! .001
were significant (all ).F ! 1
Attitudes toward the Fitness Club. We averaged the at-
titude items to form a fitness club attitude index ( ).a p .96
A 3 # 2 # 2 ANOVA resulted in a significant main effect
of argument quality ( , ), a mar-F(1, 149) p 48.51 p ! .001
ginally significant argument quality # frame interaction
( , ), and a significant three-wayF(1, 149) p 2.80 p p .064
interaction on attitudes ( , ; seeF(2, 149) p 13.89 p ! .001
fig. 1). No other effects were significant (all ). Wep 1 .60
decomposed this three-way interaction into two separate
two-way interactions to better understand the nature of this
interaction.
When the message framed the benefit of joining the fitness
club in a concrete construal (enjoy daily health activity),
there was a significant confidence state # argument quality
interaction ( , ). For participantsF(2, 149) p 8.61 p ! .001
primed to feel low in confidence, they had more favorable
attitudes toward the fitness club when the arguments were
strong ( , ) than when they were weakM p 6.13 SD p 1.07
( , ; , ). How-M p 3.28 SD p 1.28 F(1, 149) p 42.68 p ! .001
ever, for participants primed to feel highly confident, they
did not differ in their attitudes whether the arguments were
strong ( , ) or weak ( ,M p 5.05 SD p .98 M p 4.62 SD p
; ). Moreover, the attitudes of participants in the1.46 F ! 1
baseline condition were similar to those in the high-confi-
dence condition and did not differentiate between strong-
( , ) and weak-argument conditionsM p 5.25 SD p .86
( , ; , ). TheseM p 4.47 SD p 1.21 F(1, 149) p 2.02 p 1 .15
results replicate the classic finding that less confidence is
associated with more information processing.
When the message framed the benefit of joining the fitness
club in an abstract construal (enjoy lifelong health), there
was also a significant confidence state # argument quality
interaction ( , ) but with a very dif-F(2, 149) p 8.11 p ! .001
ferent form. Participants induced to feel highly confident
had more favorable attitudes when the arguments were
strong ( , ) than when they were weakM p 6.26 SD p 1.13
( , ; , ). How-M p 3.48 SD p 1.53 F(1, 149) p 42.50 p ! .001
ever, participants induced to feel less confident did not dif-
ferentiate their attitudes between the strong- ( ,M p 5.14
) and the weak-argument conditions (SD p 1.31 M p
, ; , ). Moreover,4.48 SD p 1.13 F(1, 149) p 2.36 p 1 .12
participants in the baseline condition were similar to less
confident participants in attitudes and did not differentiate
between the strong- ( , ) and the weak-M p 5.27 SD p .93
argument conditions ( , ; ). TheseM p 4.75 SD p 1.11 F ! 1
results demonstrate a reversal of the classic information-
processing effect. In addition, the results in the baseline
condition showed that their attitudes were similar to those
in conditions in which there was a mismatch between the
confidence state and the construal frame, which suggests
that the enhanced or reduced attitudes favorability was
driven by the conditions in which the construal frame en-
hanced the message relevance in the state of high or low
confidence.
Relevance as the Mediator. Participants’ responses to the
three questions that measured their perceived relevance of
the message were averaged to form a relevance score
( ). Next, a 3 # 2 # 2 ANOVA on the relevancea p .80
score indicated a marginally significant main effect of con-
fidence state ( , ) and, impor-F(2, 149) p 2.92 p p .058
tantly, a significant confidence state # construal frame two-
way interaction ( , ). No otherF(2, 149) p 12.45 p ! .001
effects were significant (all ). Simple contrasts showedF ! 1
that highly confident participants perceived the message as
more relevant to them when it was framed in the abstract
construal ( , ) than in the concrete con-M p 5.57 SD p 1.22
strual ( , ; , ),M p 4.55 SD p 1.19 F(1, 149) p 10.81 p ! .01
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FIGURE 2
PERCEIVED MESSAGE RELEVANCE AS THE MEDIATOR
(EXPERIMENT 4)
NOTE.—** p significant at .01 level; *** p significant at .001
level.
whereas the opposite was true for less confident participants:
they perceived the message as more relevant when it was
framed in the concrete construal ( , )M p 5.50 SD p 1.26
than in the abstract construal ( , ;M p 4.36 SD p 1.29
, ). Participants in the baselineF(1, 149) p 13.44 p ! .001
condition did not differ in their perceived relevance of the
message, whether the message was framed in the concrete
( , ) or abstract construal ( ,M p 4.32 SD p 1.05 M p 4.65
; ). Regardless of argument quality, partic-SD p .95 F ! 1
ipants considered the message as more relevant to them
when high confidence (low confidence) was aligned with
abstract (concrete) construals. Moreover, consistent with the
results on attitudes, participants in the baseline condition
had similar perceived message relevance to those in con-
ditions in which the confidence states did not match the
construal frame for the message.
Next, we examined the mediating role of relevance by
performing a mediated moderation analysis using the pro-
cedures recommended by Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes
(2007). In this analysis we excluded the baseline condition
to focus on examining the process underlying the matching
(vs. mismatching) between participants’ state of confidence
and construal frame. Because the confidence state # mes-
sage frame effects on fitness club attitudes were opposite in
the strong- and the weak-argument conditions, we followed
the analysis procedures used in the literature (Brin˜ol et al.
2007) and reverse coded the attitude score in the weak-
argument condition to create an “adjusted attitude” score
before conducting the mediation analysis. This procedure
essentially creates a measure of the extent of information
processing, by equating larger scores with greater infor-
mation processing.
All independent variables were standardized before being
submitted to the following analyses. First, regressing the
adjusted attitude score on confidence state (1 p high con-
fidence; 0 p low confidence), frame (1 p abstract construal;
0 p concrete construal), and their interaction indicated a
significant interaction effect ( , ,b p .42 t(1, 118) p 5.05
). Next, regressing the relevance score on confi-p ! .001
dence state, frame, and their interaction produced a signif-
icant interaction effect ( , ,b p .40 t(1, 118) p 4.78 p !
). Finally, we regressed the adjusted attitude score on.001
confidence state, frame, confidence state # frame interac-
tion, and relevance. The results showed that the effect of rel-
evance on attitudes was significant ( ,b p .55 t(1, 117) p
, ), and the size of the confidence state # frame7.12 p ! .001
interaction effect on attitudes was clearly reduced (b p
, , ; see fig. 2). Finally, the results.20 t(1, 117) p 2.64 p ! .01
of a 95% confidence interval indicated that the indirect effect
was significantly different from zero (95% CI p .16 to .45),
which provided evidence of mediation (Preacher et al. 2007;
Shrout and Bolger 2002).
We followed the same procedure to test the role of pro-
cessing ease. Participants’ responses to the two ease-of-pro-
cessing questions were averaged ( , ). A 3r p .69 a p .81
# 2 # 2 ANOVA indicated no significant effects of ex-
perimental treatment on the ease of processing (all p 1
). Thus, perceived ease or difficulty in message process-.14
ing could not account for the results. We found similar re-
sults on ease in experiment 5 and will not discuss this var-
iable further.
Discussion. Findings from experiment 4 support hy-
potheses 2 and 3. A frame that focuses individuals on ab-
stract versus concrete levels of construal has implications
for how relevant a message is perceived to be by individuals
in a state of high versus low confidence (hypothesis 2), and
this in turn affects the depth of their information processing
of the message (hypothesis 3).
Experiment 4 also ruled out an alternative possibility re-
lating to experienced ease fostering a positive experience
that influences individuals’ attitudes. First, there was no ob-
served effect on participants’ self-reported ease. Second,
presenting participants in a state of high confidence (low
confidence) with a message framed in an abstract (a con-
crete) manner enhanced attitude favorability when message
arguments were strong but reduced attitude favorability
when message arguments were weak. If the underlying pro-
cess was not relevance but simply a positive experience
associated with ease as a simple heuristic, then we should
have observed a main effect across argument quality con-
ditions, which we did not. Moreover, the null effects on
processing ease also suggest that the difference in the depth
of information processing was not driven by differences in
fluency occurring as a function of confidence and construal
framing.
EXPERIMENT 5
Experiment 5 aimed to increase the generalizability of our
findings. First, experiment 5 manipulated confidence using
a recall task adopted from past research (Gal and Rucker
2011; Tormala et al. 2008). Second, experiment 5 manip-
ulated the message frame associated with construals on the
basis of the well-documented finding that thinking about the
distant future leads to an abstract level of construal and
thinking about the near future leads to a concrete level of
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FIGURE 3
RESULTS FOR HOTEL ATTITUDES (EXPERIMENT 5)
construal (Liberman et al. 2002; Nussbaum, Trope, and Lib-
erman 2003). Thus, in experiment 5 we varied the message
frame by describing the event in the message with temporal
distance varied. As in experiment 4, we introduced the ab-
stract versus concrete frames at the outset of the processing
task and kept the actual messages identical.
Experiment 5 also added two new dependent measures
in addition to the attitude measures, one assessing behavioral
intention and the other examining message-related thoughts.
Finally, experiment 5 tested the matching effect in a new
context.
Method
One-hundred and twelve undergraduate students in Hong
Kong participated in this study. Each of them received
HK$60. Participants were randomly assigned to one of eight
conditions in a 2 (confidence state: high vs. low) # 2 (mes-
sage frame: abstract construal [distant future] vs. concrete
construal [near future]) # 2 (argument quality: strong vs.
weak) between-subjects design. Participants first completed
an episodic recall task adopted from past research to ma-
nipulate high versus low confidence (Gal and Rucker 2011;
Tormala et al. 2008). Specifically, participants were told that
they should put themselves in a state of reliving past ex-
periences and were asked to write down those experiences.
Participants in the high-confidence condition were asked to
recall and list four experiences in which they felt highly
confident and certain, and those in the low-confidence con-
dition were asked to recall four experiences in which they
felt doubtful and uncertain. Upon completing the recall task,
participants rated their feeling of confidence on a scale of
1 (not confident at all) to 9 (very confident).
Next, as part of an ostensibly unrelated task, participants
were asked to review information about a hotel. Participants
completed the task in two parts. The first part manipulated
the frame associated with construals, by telling participants
to imagine that they were booking a hotel for a vacation
trip next year (distant future) in the abstract construal con-
dition or that they were booking a hotel for a vacation trip
next week (near future) in the concrete construal condition.
The effectiveness of this manipulation was successfully con-
firmed in a pretest.
The second part of the task presented a message about
the target hotel in the form of customer reviews. In the
strong-argument condition, the reviews commented on this
hotel as having highly impressive decor with valuable paint-
ings, excellent food with a wide range of choices in its
restaurant, friendly staff fluent in English, clean rooms with
high-quality furniture, highly flexible room service, and so
on. In the weak-argument condition, the reviews depicted
this hotel as having fine but less impressive decorations
using prints, nice foods with limited choices in its restaurant,
friendly staff but with poor English, reasonably clean rooms
and basic furniture, regular room service without much flex-
ibility, and so on. We pretested the strong and weak argu-
ments using a separate sample of participants from the same
participant pool, which established that, although the cus-
tomer reviews in general talked about favorable things about
this hotel, the arguments in the two conditions differed in
persuasiveness when scrutinized carefully.
After reading the messages about the hotel, participants
indicated their attitudes on the same four 9-point semantic
differentials used in experiment 4, with higher numbers in-
dicating more favorable attitudes. Then, participants rated
the likelihood that they would book this hotel on a scale of
1 (not at all likely) to 9 (very likely) and completed the
same measures as used in experiment 4 to assess the per-
ceived relevance of the message and ease of processing.
Moreover, participants completed a thought-listing proce-
dure adopted from past research, a measure highly sensitive
to processing differences (Petty and Wegener 1998; Rucker
and Petty 2006). Finally, participants were debriefed, paid,
and thanked.
Results and Discussion
Confidence Manipulation Check. A 2 # 2 # 2 ANOVA
performed on participants’ self-reported confidence revealed
only a significant main effect of the confidence manipula-
tion: participants who recalled experiences about high con-
fidence reported feeling more confident ( ,M p 6.34 SD p
) than did participants who recalled experiences about1.51
low confidence ( , ; ,M p 3.88 SD p 1.37 F(1, 104) p 80.28
). No other effects were significant (all ).p ! .001 p 1 .15
Attitude and Behavioral Intention about the Hotel.
Participants’ responses to the four attitude items were av-
eraged to form an attitude index ( ). A 2 # 2 # 2a p .97
ANOVA resulted in a significant main effect of argument
quality ( , ) and a significantF(1, 104) p 220.81 p ! .001
three-way interaction on the attitudes toward the hotel
( , ; see fig. 3). All other effectsF(1, 104) p 20.66 p ! .001
were not significant (all p 1 .72).
Decomposing the three-way interaction into separate two-
way interactions, we found that when the hotel message was
framed in terms of a concrete construal (planning for a trip
next week), there was a significant confidence state # ar-
gument quality interaction ( , ).F(1, 104) p 11.96 p ! .001
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TABLE 1
RESULTS ON THE BEHAVIOR INTENTION AND THOUGHT FAVORABLENESS ABOUT THE HOTEL IN EXPERIMENT 5
Concrete construal frame Abstract construal frame
High confidence Low confidence High confidence Low confidence
Behavior intention:
Strong argument 6.14 (1.46) 7.29 (1.26) 7.14 (1.23) 6.15 (1.01)
Weak argument 4.86 (1.40) 3.14 (1.35) 3.36 (1.01) 4.36 (1.44)
Thought favorability:
Strong argument .54 (.53) .85 (.28) .82 (.28) .53 (.42)
Weak argument .25 (.53) .65 (.32) .67 (.35) .31 (.59)
NOTE.—For both the results on behavior intention and those on thought favorability, the 12 pairs of comparisons in the confidence state #
construal frame # argument quality interactions are all significant (all p ! .05). Standard deviation in parentheses.
This interaction revealed that participants in a state of low
confidence exhibited a greater difference between strong
( , ) and weak arguments ( ,M p 7.77 SD p .93 M p 3.67
; , ) compared toSD p 1.27 F(1, 104) p 100.03 p ! .001
participants in a state of high confidence (strong: ,M p 6.73
; weak: , ;SD p 1.14 M p 4.64 SD p 1.05 F(1, 104) p
, ). These findings replicate the classic effect26.11 p ! .001
in the literature that low confidence is associated with greater
information processing compared with high confidence.
When the hotel message was framed in terms of an ab-
stract construal (planning for a trip next year), there was
also a significant confidence state # argument quality in-
teraction ( , ). However, this two-F(1, 104) p 8.78 p ! .01
way interaction took the opposite form of that found when
the message was framed in a concrete construal. High-con-
fidence participants exhibited a stronger differentiation be-
tween strong ( , ) and weak argumentsM p 7.63 SD p 1.05
( , ; , ) com-M p 3.78 SD p .96 F(1, 104) p 88.18 p ! .001
pared to low-confidence participants (strong: ,M p 6.82
; weak: , ;SD p .97 M p 4.69 SD p 1.19 F(1, 104) p
, ). These results reverse the classic relation-27.01 p ! .001
ship between confidence state and information processing.
Similar analyses were conducted to examine participants’
intention to book the hotel. The 2 # 2 # 2 ANOVA indicated
a significant main effect of argument quality (F(1, 104) p
, ) and a significant three-way interactions on126.67 p ! .001
intention to book a room at the hotel ( ,F(1, 104) p 24.69
). All other effects were not significant (allp ! .001 p 1
). Decomposing the three-way interaction into two sep-.38
arate two-way interactions revealed similar patterns as those
on the attitudes measure. See table 1 for means and signif-
icance tests across conditions.
Thoughts. Participants’ thoughts related to the hotel
message were classified as positive, negative, or neutral by
two judges unaware of the conditions and hypotheses.
Judges agreed on 97% of the thought classifications, and
disagreements were resolved by discussion. To form a
thought favorability index, we subtracted the number of neg-
ative message-related thoughts from the number of positive
message-related thoughts and divided this difference by the
total number of message-related thoughts (Cacioppo and
Petty 1981). The results on the thought favorability mirrored
the results on the attitudes about the hotel (see table 1).
Relevance as the Mediator. Participants’ responses to the
three questions that measured their perceived relevance of
the message were averaged to form a relevance score
( ). A 2 # 2 # 2 ANOVA on the relevance scorea p .88
indicated a significant confidence state # message frame
two-way interaction ( , ). No otherF(1, 104) p 22.88 p ! .001
effects were significant (all ). Simple contrastsp 1 .14
showed that participants in a state of high confidence per-
ceived the message as more relevant to them when it was
framed in the abstract construal ( , )M p 6.48 SD p 1.38
than in the concrete construal ( , ;M p 5.42 SD p 1.41
, ), whereas participants in a stateF(1, 104) p 9.08 p ! .01
of low confidence perceived the message as more relevant
when it was framed in the concrete ( ,M p 6.61 SD p
) rather than the abstract construal ( ,1.14 M p 5.29 SD p
; , ).1.26 F(1, 104) p 14.13 p ! .001
Next, we examined the mediating role of relevance by
performing a mediated moderation analysis using the same
procedure described in experiment 4. Regressing the ad-
justed attitude score on confidence state, frame, and their
interaction indicated a significant interaction effect (b p
, , ). Regressing the relevance.30 t(1, 108) p 3.81 p ! .001
score on confidence state, frame, and their interaction resulted
in a significant interaction effect ( , ,b p .43 t(1, 108) p 4.88
). Finally, regressing the adjusted attitude score onp ! .001
confidence state, frame, confidence state # frame interac-
tion, and relevance showed that the main effect of relevance
was significant ( , , ), andb p .38 t(1, 106) p 4.03 p ! .001
the size of the confidence state # frame interaction effect
on attitudes was clearly reduced ( ,b p .18 t(1, 106) p
, ). A confidence interval test revealed that the1.95 p p .052
indirect effect was significantly different from zero (95%
CI p .10 to .37; Preacher et al. 2007; Shrout and Bolger
2002), provided evidence of mediation.
Discussion. Experiment 5 replicated the matching effect
documented in experiment 4 in a different product category,
used a different manipulation of confidence, and varied the
framing associated with construals. Results on attitudes,
thoughts, and behavioral intention showed that when the
message was framed in a concrete construal, we again rep-
licated the classic effects of confidence on information pro-
cessing. However, when the message was framed in an ab-
stract construal, these classic findings reversed: individuals
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in a state of high confidence processed information more
than those in a state of low confidence. The mediation anal-
ysis supported that the effect was driven by differences in
perceived relevance of the message.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Traditional research on information processing has found
that a state of high confidence often reduces the depth of
information processing compared to a state of low confi-
dence (e.g., Chaiken et al. 1989). The current research offers
a new theoretical perspective that high- and low-confidence
states lead to qualitatively different thinking captured by
differences in abstract versus concrete construals. As such,
we argued that the relevance of the message, and thus the
depth of information processing, depends on the construal
level at which the message is framed.
Support for the major propositions was found across five
experiments. Experiments 1–3, using both construal-level
measures and behavioral indicators in decision contexts,
found that participants in a state of high confidence (low
confidence) exhibited behavior more consistent with an ab-
stract (concrete) level of construal. Experiments 4 and 5
demonstrated that whether a state of high confidence or low
confidence increases or decreases information processing
depends on whether a message is framed in a concrete or
an abstract construal. The classic pattern of how confidence
influences information processing occurred when messages
were framed in concrete terms, but this pattern reversed
when messages were framed in abstract terms. Furthermore,
our effects were mediated by perceived relevance (experi-
ments 4 and 5).
Theoretical Contribution
For the information-processing literature, we provide a
new revelation about the psychological consequences of be-
ing in a state of high versus low confidence for subsequent
information processing. A large body of prior research has
found that states of high versus low confidence induce dif-
ferent perceptions of the self-assessed knowledge suffi-
ciency, and such a difference leads to greater processing
when consumers have low confidence as opposed to high
confidence (Chaiken et al. 1989; Maheswaran and Chaiken
1991; Tiedens and Linton 2001; Weary and Jacobson 1997).
The current research identifies that states of confidence can
differ in the levels of construal they provoke. As a conse-
quence, a state of high confidence can enhance subsequent
information processing when the message is framed in an
abstract construal (vs. a concrete construal), whereas a state
of low confidence enhances subsequent information pro-
cessing when the message is framed in a concrete construal
(vs. an abstract construal).
In the current investigation, we focus on situations in
which the confidence was incidental to the information pro-
cessed. Our findings demonstrate that incidentally experi-
enced confidence can carry over and influence the process-
ing of messages unrelated to the context that induced a state
of high or low confidence. However, in one experiment not
reported in this article, we found evidence that similar effects
occur when the confidence is relevant to the message do-
main. Specifically, we followed a procedure similar to ex-
periment 4, but we manipulated whether individuals felt low
or high in confidence in the domain of fitness and then
exposed them to a message related to fitness. Conceptually
replicating experiment 4 and 5, we found that individuals
with low confidence in their fitness knowledge processed a
message more when it was framed with a concrete construal,
whereas individuals with high confidence in their fitness
knowledge processed a message more when it was framed
with an abstract construal.
The current research also potentially enhances our un-
derstanding of past findings documented in the literature
that high confidence (low confidence) decreases (increases)
the depth of information processing (Edwards 2003; Tiedens
and Linton 2001; Weary and Jacobson 1997). As discussed
earlier, it is possible that in prior investigations the target
message was described in relatively concrete construals
(e.g., describing a comprehensive exam in terms of its low-
level benefits in enhancing grades rather than the high-level
benefits for intellectual and career development; Edwards
2003). This observation suggests that manipulating construal
level might significantly moderate past findings in the lit-
erature.
The current research also extends the literature on con-
strual levels (Liberman and Trope 1998; Trope and Liberman
2003) on two grounds. First, we identify confidence as a
new psychological state that can influence construal levels.
The distinction between concrete and abstract construals has
played a central role in research ranging from person per-
ception (Gilbert and Malone 1995) to social categorization
(Nussbaum et al. 2003). Construal-level theory (Trope and
Liberman 2003) has suggested that the abstract, high-level
construal often promotes high confidence because the ab-
stract construal contains less incidental and contextual fea-
tures that have been found to undermine confidence in pre-
dictions (Griffin, Dunning, and Ross 1990; Sherman 1980).
We document that the reversed causal path can also hold.
Second, our results extend recent work by Zhao and Xie
(2011). Zhao and Xie find that congruity between the social
distance dimension (e.g., product recommendation by close
others vs. distant others) and the temporal distance dimen-
sion of a message (e.g., the product is for the use in the
near future vs. distant future) increases persuasion. Fur-
thermore, they suggest that this occurs due to a shift in
perceived relevance. The current research examines the
match between a new set of constructs related to construal
levels and, importantly, demonstrates that the match influ-
ences the depth of information processing, which could in-
crease or decrease attitude favorableness, depending on the
quality of the accompanying arguments.
Future Directions
It will be important for future research to examine bound-
ary conditions for the links among states of confidence,
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construals, and information processing. As one potential
boundary condition, we posit that the perception of how
benign or problematic the situation is might moderate the
effect. We have argued that low confidence leads to the
perception of having insufficient knowledge in a specific
context, which indicates that individuals might be in a prob-
lematic situation. The way to address this problematic sit-
uation is to focus on the detailed information in the context,
which activates concrete construals. However, if individuals
perceive a situation as problematic, they should generate
more concrete construals regardless of their confidence
level. In an initial test of this idea, we found that when
participants were primed to perceive a situation as problem-
atic, both states of high and low confidence led participants
to generate relatively concrete construals. Further studies
are required to systematically examine this effect and other
boundary conditions.
Demonstrating the link between confidence and construal
levels also suggests an avenue for future research, which is
to examine the impact of confidence on a wide range of
consumer decisions. If states of high and low confidence
activate different construal levels, then psychological con-
fidence has the potential to influence consumer behavior in
a variety of ways such as consumers’ predictions about time
(Trope and Liberman 2003), self-control (Agrawal and Wan
2009; Fujita et al. 2006), response to brand extensions (Al-
exander, Lynch, and Wang 2008), and processing pictorial
or verbal information (Amit, Algom, and Trope 2009). In-
deed, experiments 2 and 3 are examples of new effects of
confidence based on recognizing its relation to construal
levels. As a concrete example for future research, prior re-
search has shown that information processing is more ef-
ficient when the information presentation is pictorial (verbal)
for objects portrayed with psychological proximity (dis-
tance). Given that a state of high confidence activates ab-
stract construals, which are associated with psychological
distance, then one can predict that information processing
might be enhanced for consumers in a state of high confi-
dence when the information is presented in words rather
than in pictures. Future studies can examine this prediction
and its implication for advertising.
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